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A L E R T I N G   P R O C E D U R E S  
I N  
I N T E L L I G E N C E

*Second*  
FIRST DRAFT  
27 October 1953  
25 Jan 1954

Army, DOS reviews completed  
Declassification/Release Instructions on File

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B/S/les

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27 Oct '53

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Survey of Alerting Procedure in Intelligence

1. On 1 October the AD/CI approved my request that you three serve as an ad hoc group to assist me in the preparation of my final report on the above subject.

2. Attached is a rough first draft of a final report. As you know, this is backed up by over 200 pages of detailed notes complete with index of subjects and names. It has been suggested that only the summary be sent to the IAC, but that the full report in the form attached would be useful to others.

*Monday, 2 November*

3. The draft report has been typed with wide margins to provide you ample space to make scathing and cutting remarks. I trust that we may be able to meet on Friday, 30 October, to discuss the draft and particularly the following general questions:

- a. Is this form of report useful?
- b. Does the report cover the subjects most important to know?
- c. Would graphics in the form of organization charts or flow charts justify the labor of preparing them?
- d. To whom should a report of this sort be sent?

4. I will check with each of you ~~before Friday~~ to set up a convenient time and meeting place.

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cc - AD/CI

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*Second*  
~~17 October 1953~~  
~~25 Jan 54~~

## ALERTING PROCEDURES IN INTELLIGENCE

~~Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations~~

### I. The Problem

- A. General
- B. Procedure
- C. Form of This Report

### II. Sources

- A. Collection Responsibilities
- B. Operational Cables

~~Communications~~

### III. Communications

- A. General
- B. Channels into IAC Agencies
- C. Handling in Intelligence
- D. Channels to the Command and Policy Level

~~By Communications~~

### IV. Evaluation

- A. In the Field
- B. During Duty Hours
- C. During Non-duty Hours

~~By Communications~~

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V. Watch Officers

- A. General
- B. Personnel
- C. Procedures
- D. Aids

*Details of Procedures in Each IAC Agency*

~~Details of~~ ~~Procedures~~

~~Information~~

~~Description of Each Agency's Procedures~~

Tab A - The Problem

Tab B - Central Intelligence Agency -

- (1) Foreign Intelligence
- (2) Office of Operations
- (3) Office of Current Intelligence.

Tab C. Department of State

Tab D. Department of the Army

Tab E. Department of the Navy

Tab F. Department of the Air Force -

Tab G. Atomic Energy Commission.

Tab H. Joint Intelligence Group.

Tab I. Federal Bureau of Investigation

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**SUMMARY**

1. The summary of the facts gained through a detailed survey of alerting procedures in intelligence as authorized by IAC-D-70 indicates that all Agencies are well aware of the need for, and of their responsibilities connected with, the prompt handling of critical and important information in Washington. The survey covered all phases of the alerting procedure in all IAC Agencies, and included the handling of material from the point of initial receipt, to delivery to the command or policy level.

**CONCLUSIONS:**

2. Although existing sources of critical and important intelligence are exploited, it was found that inadequate mechanisms exist to assure that information contained in "operational" communications gets promptly into intelligence channels. An example of this was the RB-50 plane shot down by the Russians off Vladivostok on 29 June, information on which did not reach intelligence channels until about five hours after the fact was known to operations officers. Virtually all Agencies participating in the survey stated that either for security reasons or because of a lack of "intelligence mindedness" on the part of the operations or policy level, operational information is not gratuitously passed to Intelligence. However, in most Agencies this information can be obtained by Intelligence if a specific request is made for a given item.

3. Communications channels exist and are thought to be adequate for the prompt transmission of readily recognizable critical items. However, this <sup>is</sup> presumes that such items be given a sufficiently high transmission precedence to assure that ~~all~~ other traffic is pushed aside. Secure communications in

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Washington are inadequate. No secure channels exist to permit all IAC member Agencies to exchange classified information other than through the use of a relatively slow and complicated teletype hook-up. The Agencies ~~said~~ <sup>state</sup> that information can be exchanged quickest through the use of couriers.

5. Watch or duty officers serve to a greater or lesser extent in all Agencies except AEC. Key officials in all Agencies can be reached during off-duty hours. CIA, NSA, and Air Defense Command have full-time watch officers who serve solely in this capacity with no other duties. The other Agencies rotate officers assigned to other functions to cover the off-duty hours. In general, adequate watch officer aids exist in each Agency in the form of briefing manuals, watch officer books, home phone numbers of key officials, regulations, and instructions. Most Agencies brief their watch officers on current intelligence items prior to entry on duty.

Within their <sup>assigned</sup> ~~but~~ <sup>their</sup> responsibilities, 4. All Agencies have at their disposal adequate means, through competent analysts, for evaluating critical information, <sup>4 important</sup> for supplying necessary background and comment, and for assuring that a relatively complete statement is made, provided that <sup>the necessary</sup> additional information is available. However, most watch officers lack the detailed knowledge necessary to recognize obscure items, and there is no <sup>Joint</sup> central file or display mechanism to serve, not as <sup>the</sup> substitute for analysis, but as an aid both to evaluation and to watch officers.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That arrangements be made to assure that information contained in operational communications be passed without delay into <sup>intelligence</sup> channels.

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2. That a technical survey be made of the secure communications link between the IAC Agencies in Washington with the aim of establishing secure channels, preferably to be used as a telephone.
4. That the Service Agencies and State establish full-time watch officers to provide continuity. (As AEC and JIG have no specified collection responsibility, and as the FBI procedure is adequate for the <sup>4 nature</sup> amount of critical information it collects, it is felt unnecessary to establish a full-time watch procedure in these three Agencies.)
3. That a <sup>(Joint, Substantive)</sup> centralised indications mechanism be established so that individual Agency analysts and watch officers may call in <sup>(2. above)</sup> and discuss critical items as an aid to their preliminary evaluation.

*(DwP)*  
*Say XW.*

1. Summary too brief -

*2. Pre procedures now adequate - not stated in Summary -*

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I. ~~THE~~ PROBLEM

A. General

1. On 6 July 1953 the Intelligence Advisory Committee issued IAC-D-70, "Proposed Survey of Alerting Procedures in Intelligence". This directive states that NSCID No. 1 assigns specific responsibilities to the IAC and its member agencies in the event that information is received indicating impending foreign crisis situations or foreign conditions that affect the security of the United States. The directive recognizes that alerting procedures now exist in each agency and states that the AD/CI desires that they be reviewed as a whole periodically and proposes that the IAC collaborate in a fact-finding survey to begin at the point of receipt of incoming information and examine all steps in its routing. The survey would point up gaps in existing procedures, should any gaps exist, and would bring together in one place the details of these procedures. The AD/CI accepted responsibility for the survey and designated [REDACTED] as the Intelligence Officer to conduct it.

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2. By mid-July all the IAC agencies submitted the names of officers to be contacted, the only restriction being that in certain instances Intelligence could not give permission for visits to Staff Communications Centers that were operated at a higher level in the command channel.

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3. The AD/CI instructed [REDACTED] to deal only with the designated representatives of the participating agencies and such members of those agencies as the representatives might indicate. He stressed that authorization of the project implied no inspection rights.

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**B. Procedure**

1. The survey was conducted through visits to and interviews in all <sup>IAC</sup> agencies including the collection and current intelligence production parts of CIA. In many instances it was possible to trace the actual handling of a recent item, for example, the shooting down of an RB-50 reconnaissance plane by the Russians off Vladivostok on 29 June.

2. Although agencies, except AFC, have published directives and instructions for the guidance of individuals charged with the handling of critical information, an effort was made to go beyond these publications to find out exactly how critical information is handled and who the people are who handle it.

3. An extension of the survey was accomplished through a visit to the Air Defense Command in Colorado Springs with the Watch Committee late in August. This provided an opportunity to observe a well-conceived and well-run evaluation procedure that centers in the ADC Indications Board, as well as an opportunity to learn the procedures followed at one of the commands, a vital recipient of IAC-produced intelligence.

4. The NSC defines "critical information" as -- " . . . information that indicates an impending crisis situation, such as the outbreak of hostilities involving the United States, or a condition which affects the security of the United States to such an extent that immediate action or decision on the part of the President or the National Security Council seems to be required . . ." No adequate term has been found in use that

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covers information as defined plus marginal information which might develop into a critical situation. Therefore, the term <sup>important</sup> "critical information" is used in this report to cover both information that clearly meets the NSC definition as well as <sup>of critical information</sup> all other information that requires prompt handling.

C. Form of This Report

1. This report describes the principal procedures involved in the handling of critical information throughout the IAC agencies. Information is organized functionally to indicate the methods applied to each step in all agencies.
2. Tables are attached summarizing the organization and methods of operation in each agency.

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II. SOURCES

A. Collection Responsibilities

1. CIA, State, and the three Service Agencies all have specific collection responsibilities overseas. CIA is responsible for all covert collection as a service of common concern; State and the Services collect through their overseas missions and commands. The FBI has a domestic collection responsibility which is met through the operations of its 52 field offices in the major US cities, Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. The AEC, while having no specified collection responsibility, receives information from its traveling scientists [redacted]

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[redacted] JIG has no collection

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[redacted] responsibility and works with the information produced by the other IAC Agencies.

2. Information collected as outlined above is transmitted to Washington either by cable or by pouch. Initial screening in the field results in the decision that a given item is to be sent by cable and <sup>if necessary</sup> results in the assignment of a transmission precedence indicator to assure prompt handling.

3. All agencies pointed out that much ~~critical~~ <sup>important</sup> information appears first in press releases. Explanations of this have ranged all the way from the fact that the press services conduct world-wide, point-by-point coverage, through the fact

that the press services are not hampered by security requirements, to the statement that the press services may adopt a somewhat irresponsible attitude and report a suspected incident only to deny the report shortly thereafter. Most information on the June 17 Berlin riots came from press releases.

4. Each agency has its own system of establishing requirements and priorities for the collection of information, and various priorities committees exist. However, further review and coordination is required to ensure priority attention to <sup>important</sup> critical items. Facilities exist for the follow-up of an item through the issuance of specific requirements, although the opinion has been expressed that more use should be made of this possibility.

**B. Operational Cables**

1. Frequently "operational" messages contain intelligence information. Seldom is this information gratuitously passed into intelligence channels, although sincere efforts have been made by both the operations officers and the intelligence officers to assure that this is done. It has been explained that this failure normally results either because of a lack of "intelligence mindedness" on the part of the operations officers or for security reasons dictated by Operations. However, seldom does Operations deny the information to Intelligence provided a specific request is made for a given item.

2. In CIA the dictates of security are largely responsible for the reluctance on the part of operations officers to pass information to Intelligence. An example of this occurred some

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3. In the Department of State some information is withheld from Intelligence or at best given very limited distribution where the information bears directly on negotiations then underway. However, the greatest difficulty experienced by State's intelligence officers is caused by a lack of "intelligence mindedness" on the part of State officials as a result of <sup>domestic</sup> <sup>4A</sup> which they fail to appreciate the importance to Intelligence of a given item.

b. On 29 July an Air Force RB-50 plane was shot down by the Russians near Vladivostok. This fact was first known to Operations as "one of our RB-50's is overdue". Operations did not at first appreciate that this information was of value to Intelligence and the facts were not made known to Intelligence until specifically requested, <sup>Some</sup> Intelligence information on this case was not received until <sup>some</sup> <sup>^</sup> six hours after the fact was first known to Operations.

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C. Conclusions

1. A large volume of critical information received in Intelligence comes from press releases. <sup>Unpublished</sup>

2. Requirements lists need to be vitalized and more use should be made of requirements mechanisms to follow up critical important items.

3. Intelligence contained in "operational" communications is not available gratuitously to Intelligence, either because of security or because of a lack of "intelligence mindedness" on the part of Operations officers.

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### III. COMMUNICATIONS

#### A. General

1. ~~Critical~~ <sup>Important</sup> information coming into Washington has been screened in the field, at least to the extent that readily recognizable items are normally sent by cable or other means of equally rapid transmission.
2. Occasionally ~~critical~~ <sup>important</sup> information may be included in pouched material and not be recognized as ~~critical~~ <sup>important</sup> until evaluated by Washington analysts who are able to relate it to additional information, usually from other sources and not available to the field evaluators.

#### B. Channels into IAC Agencies

1. Overseas communications comes into CIA, State, and the three Service Agencies by way of communications centers not under the control of Intelligence. In CIA the Office of Communications maintains the Signal Center, which is assisted in the routing of cables by the Cable Secretariat, a part of the DCI staff. In the Department of State communications are received first in the Division of Communications, and in the three Services in individual staff communications centers.

2. These communication centers are staffed by communications experts rather than intelligence personnel. Although the individuals pride themselves on their ability to move traffic promptly, they are generally not informed on

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intelligence matters, and must rely primarily on precedence

indicators [REDACTED]

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to assure that special handling is given to critical items.

Normally, the decision made in the field that the item is to be sent by electrical means includes the decision that it be given precedence handling, and most <sup>important</sup> critical items are so marked.

3. The scope of this survey did not permit visits to communications centers, except in CIA and Air, as the centers are not under control of Intelligence, and special permission would have been required from the "Chief of Staff" level. However, there was no evidence that intelligence requirements, <sup>intelligence use</sup> check lists, or other aids are <sup>used</sup> by communications centers to alert the operators to the importance of <sup>importance</sup> a critical item that does not carry a precedence indicator. Informants in the intelligence agencies interviewed stated, however, that frequently communications centers are informed that traffic from a given station during a given period should be considered <sup>important</sup> critical and should be passed promptly. An example was the period following the June 17 Berlin Riots.

4. The communications centers produce multiple copies of incoming material and route them to stated addressees with information copies to the command and policy level and to the various segments of the agency's own intelligence unit. Except

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for limited distribution or closely held items, distribution is also made to other IAC intelligence units where the incoming information is clearly of an intelligence nature.

5. Delivery by the communications centers is by courier, although pneumatic tubes are used by the Service Agencies in the Pentagon.

6. JIG receives copies of other agencies' traffic and FBI, Washington has its own teletype, telephone, and radio nets for communications from the field offices. The AEC receives cables from its traveling scientists, but these are normally of an purely administrative nature. However, certain AEC communications are routed to the Intelligence Staff, where they are scanned for possible intelligence content.

C. Handling in Intelligence

1. Material is delivered by the communications centers to message centers, cable sections, and similar organizations in each of the intelligence units. In CIA such message centers are located in the divisions of DD/P to handle CIA-procured information, and in OCD for copies of communications coming from the other IAC Agencies.

2. Generally, the cable desks and similar collection points sort the material according to the organizational breakdown of the intelligence component. Delivery is made by courier, either

directly to analysts' desks or, usually, to a secondary collection point at the next lower level, where the material is again sorted according to individual desks and analysts, and again delivered by courier or picked up periodically by the analysts themselves.

3. ~~In general~~, Courier pickups in virtually all agencies are made each hour for routine traffic.



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D. Channels to the Command and Policy Level

1. The item is evaluated as described in Section IV

below, and is disseminated to the command and policy level in each agency, and to the Service and State Overseas activities and Commands.

2. For example, in CIA, evaluation is made in OCI by the regional specialists in the divisions. The resultant intelligence is passed through channels to the AD/CI, who in turn passes it to the DD/I, who takes it to the DCI. No electrical or speedy means exist for this transmission, and it is, therefore, handled by courier or by the hand of the official himself. The other agencies follow a similar command-line channel to the Chief of Staff or Secretary, the ultimate recipient. If the item warrants, it is passed to the NSC

and to the White House, using RDP79B01737A000900010009-6

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the hand of the senior official or Secretary concerned.

3. Lateral dissemination is possible and frequently occurs at all levels. As has been explained above, the raw incoming information is disseminated to all agencies. In addition, the finished intelligence is usually laterally disseminated upon completion of evaluation. This can be accomplished through a somewhat complicated and rather slow teletype hookup that links the intelligence agencies in the Pentagon with State Department and CIA, or, as is more frequently done, by courier and staff car.

E. Conclusions

~~1. Critical~~ items recognized in the field are assigned a sufficiently high precedence indicator to assure prompt transmission both by electrical means and by hand after they have reached Washington.

2. Routine items move much more slowly, particularly after they get into Washington intelligence channels and come under the routing and courier procedures which may result in as much as an hour's delay at each collecting point.

3. Points of initial entry at the "staff" level in each Agency handle all communications from the field and are not <sup>Always</sup> sensitive to Intelligence requirements. Only those items which are addressed to Intelligence and which carry high precedence indicators are guaranteed instantaneous dispatch into Intelligence.

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*Secure facilities exist in Washington, but are not  
adequate for the*

4. No secure facilities exist in Washington for the ~~without~~ handling of critical information by telephone or by telecon, the only facility being a rather complicated and somewhat slow teletype hookup between CIA, State, and the Service agencies. The intelligence product could be vastly improved and delays in transmission largely eliminated if an inter-Agency, secure telephone link could be established to be used by evaluators, analysts, and watch officers.

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IV. EVALUATION

A. In the Field

1. To a large extent all items transmitted from the field to Washington are evaluated prior to such transmission. This may include no more than a decision that a given item is to be sent by electrical means as [redacted] 25X1A. This form of evaluation through selection takes place in all five of the agencies with collection responsibilities overseas.

2. G-2 bases its entire alerting procedure on the policy of having competent analysts as far forward in the field as possible, and relying on these analysts to make a fairly thorough initial evaluation and selection.

3. This survey did not go into field procedures through visits to field installations. Those interviewed in Washington expressed the opinion that a field survey is highly desirable as Washington analysts are extremely dependent on the field organizations to select <sup>important</sup> critical items for speedy transmission to Washington. It was felt that despite a soundly conceived and efficiently run organization in Washington, failure could result from a lack of awareness of importance in the field to the end that <sup>an important</sup> the critical item would not be recognized and would not come to the attention of the Washington mechanism in time to serve as a warning. In CIA it was stated that field procedures vary widely according to areas. In State field evaluation depends to a large extent on the "intelligence

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Those interviewed in the

"mindedness" of the senior policy official. The service agencies point out that as their <sup>Agency</sup> mission is primarily military they <sup>Special</sup> those interviewed were unable to indicate the action that would be taken in the field in the event an economic or political item was collected.

B. During Duty Hours

1. CIA, State, and the three service agencies maintain staffs to evaluate and analyze incoming material. Routing procedures get <sup>important</sup> critical information into the hands of these analysts where the information is compared with other known facts, and where background information and comments are added.

[REDACTED]

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3. Most agencies provide double or triple checks to assure that <sup>important</sup> critical items are not overlooked and that proper evaluation is made. For example, in G-2 copies of incoming <sup>important</sup> critical items are routed to area analysts, to the Watch Committee Secretariat, and to the G-2 Operations Room, #1 three of which are <sup>Complaint To</sup> capable of recognizing the importance of incoming information and of taking immediate action.

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4. Nuclear energy matters are evaluated by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC). Nuclear Energy Division of OSI chairs this committee and provides its staff. Members are representatives from State, AEC, Army, Navy, and Air Force. The committee meets regularly each week and is on call at all times including non-duty hours.

5. At Air Defense Command in Colorado Springs, the evaluation procedure is centered in the ADC Indications Board. <sup>Important</sup> Thus, all incoming critical items are related to one or more categories of indicators and evaluated in conjunction with other items in the same or related categories. This mechanism provides a mechanical memory in depth to assure continuity of thought on the part of the evaluators. The ADC Indications Board does not attempt to use a mechanical means as a substitute for careful analysis and evaluation, but rather to provide uniformity and an orderly approach to assure that all facets are considered from the standpoint of past information as well as the item's relation to other subjects comprising the indicator list.

6. Most of the individuals interviewed who are concerned with the evaluation procedure felt that a weakness exists in that Intelligence is not kept fully informed regarding US operations, whether diplomatic, military, or clandestine. Thus, it is frequently very difficult for evaluation officers to determine whether a <sup>foreign government's</sup> Soviet move is an action or a reaction.

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C. During Non-duty Hours

1. The watch officer procedure in intelligence is described in Section V below. With the exception of ADC, the watch officers participate in the evaluation procedure only to the extent that they call in appropriate officials, including regional and subject evaluation officers and analysts.

2. All IAC agencies maintain up-to-date lists of home phone numbers of officials to be called either by watch officers or by switchboard operators. Thus, if <sup>"impartial"</sup> a critical item is received, either as collected by an agency itself or as received by it through lateral dissemination of the "raw" transmission, evaluators and analysts are among those called in.

3. When evaluators report to their officers as the result of a non-duty hour call, they have access to their own files and records and prepare the item for dissemination as outlined above.

D. Conclusions

1. A survey <sup>by each Agency</sup> <sup>of its</sup> of the adequacy of the field evaluation process is desirable.

2. Evaluation in Washington is, in general, adequate and prompt.

3. Each incoming item is routed to <sup>a number of</sup> <sup>various</sup> offices and staffs for evaluation according to the recipient's mission. This constitutes a multiple check to insure that items are not overlooked.

4. The ADC Indications Board provides a mechanical memory in depth as an aid to the evaluators. Consideration should be given to the use of some such device in other parts of Intelligence.

5. Evaluators are not kept adequately informed regarding US

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Security Information

diplomatic, military, and clandestine operations. Therefore, a foreign government's they are frequently unable to differentiate between ~~Secret~~ actions and reactions.

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**V. WATCH OFFICERS**

**A. General**

1. All IAC agencies operate some sort of a watch mechanism. The term "watch officer" is used in this report to denote an intelligence function and "duty officer" refers to command or <sup>administrative</sup> operational functions.

2. In some agencies the watch function is on a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week basis, while in others a watch function is conducted only during non-duty hours.

**B. Personnel**

1. CIA, NSA, and ADC have full-time watch officers who operate the watch office on a 24-hour-a-day basis and who have no other assigned duties. These agencies place considerable reliance on the full-time watch officer, this reliance being justified by the continuity provided.

2. ~~the~~ State Department's Communications Division, the point of receipt for overseas cables, operates 24 hours a day and the senior official present notifies members of Intelligence <sup>important</sup> if critical information comes to his attention. Intelligence officers in State remain on call in their homes on a roster basis during non-duty hours, and watch officers are on duty in the offices of the Special Assistant, Intelligence from 0900 to 1200 on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, and in the office of the Director of Intelligence Research from 0845 to 1300 on the same days.

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3. In C-2 the Operations Room is open 24 hours a day and during non-duty hours is manned by two officers and two enlisted men, the officers serve on a roster basis and draw duty approximately once each month. C-2 finds the roster procedure adequate as the individuals selected for the duty are senior officers whose job is normally that of making decisions and of keeping informed on intelligence matters.
4. In Navy the senior officer in the watch mechanism is a Duty Captain, a section or branch head in ONI, who stands watch in his home and is on call. He is backed up by four watch and duty officers in their offices, all of whom operate on a roster basis.
5. In Air Forces the senior duty officer during non-duty hours is located in the Air Force Command Post, is a general officer, and has full authority to act for the Air Force. The most important intelligence officer during non-duty hours is the air estimates officer, who serves on rotation and who is located in the intelligence area with all files and materials available to him.
6. The AFC does not keep watch officers on duty in their offices during non-duty hours, but the AFC switchboard is supplied with home phone numbers of key officials, both in intelligence and in other parts of the Commission.

7. In JIG senior officials are on duty in their offices Saturday and Sunday morning, and an officer is on duty in the office of the Director of the Joint Staff on a 24-hour-a-day basis. The JIG Situation Room is open and in operation 24 hours a day, and key officials can be contacted at their homes and called in in the event <sup>important</sup> ~~of vital~~ information is received.

8. In the FBI a full-time supervisor who has this as his only job comes on duty at four each afternoon and works until midnight to insure continuity during the period when the West Coast offices are still open even though the Washington office has closed. In addition, supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence unit serve as watch officers in the office of the Assistant Director for Domestic Intelligence. These supervisors serve a two-week tour of duty, thus providing greater continuity than if they were rotated each night.

9. At Air Defense Command in Colorado Springs the watch officers have no other duties and operate the office 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. These officers, generally majors and captains, maintain the Indications Board and brief the Commanding General in the morning. Their job is primarily evaluation.

C. Procedures

1. Watch officers, whether fulltime or rotated, are the <sup>Superior</sup> point of receipt for critical information during non-duty hours.

In general, watch officers read all material passed to them during their tours of duty and pay particular attention to the prompt handling of items carrying a precedence indicator of "Priority" or higher.

2. The duties of the watch officers in the various agencies vary slightly, but, in general, are limited to the calling-in of responsible officials or estimators.

3. In CIA's Signal Center and Cable Secretariat the watch officers call in appropriate Area Division Reports Officers of Foreign Intelligence, who in turn make the evaluation and prepare a PD for lateral dissemination by teletype. The Agency watch officer in OCI makes a preliminary evaluation, calls in senior officials, including the Director, and also calls the appropriate evaluation officers and analysts.

4. In most other agencies evaluation officers, analysts, and chiefs of branches and divisions are called and they, in turn, make the decision to call senior officials.

D. Aids

1. Watch officers throughout are supplied with watch officer books containing published instructions and regulations, lists of home phone numbers of on-call officials and evaluation officers, and memoranda giving detailed steps to be followed by the

*Important*  
watch officer in the event ~~critical~~ information is received.

2. There was virtually no mention of maps or graphics as aids to watch officers, although, presumably, these are available in those agencies where the watch function takes place in a situation or operations room. An exception to this is Air Defense Command, where the entire watch function is geared to the Indications Board and related maps.

3. Watch officers are briefed on the current situation before they enter on duty and are usually given special instructions as to what to look for if an incident is being closely followed by current intelligence. An example of this occurred ~~at the time of the Berlin riots.~~

4. As mentioned under Section III, Communications, there is no secure method of communication between the watch mechanisms except a slow and generally inadequate teletype link. Those interviewed stated that in the event of a major emergency, the telephone would have to be used despite the need for security.

E. Conclusions

1. Continuity is lost through the practice of rotating watch officers for a one-night tour of duty every month or so. The Service Agencies and State should provide full-time watch officers who have this as their only assignment and thus assure continuity during non-duty hours.

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Security Information

2. The collection responsibilities in FBI are adequately met by the Bureau's present procedure. There appears to be no need to increase procedures now being followed in JIG and AEC.

3. Watch officer aids are adequate as far as procedural directives and on-call phone lists are concerned but inadequate with respect to maps and graphic aids of the type illustrated by the ADC Indications Board.

4. Watch officers lack adequate means of secure communications during non-duty hours.

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*Important*

**VI. RECOMMENDATIONS**

NOTE: The following items are listed in the order in which they appear in the foregoing sections of this report. No attempt has been made here to place recommendations in priority order according to their importance.

(10) 1. An across-the-board survey should be undertaken to determine why much ~~critical~~ <sup>important</sup> information comes first, and sometimes only, from the press services.

(9) 2. Existing ~~check-sheets~~ <sup>and</sup> requirements lists should be ~~brought~~ <sup>kept</sup> up to date and vitalized, and a greater effort should be made to use existing facilities to obtain follow-up information in critical situations.

(1) 3. Arrangements should be made to assure that information contained in operational communications is passed without delay into intelligence channels. To accomplish this it will probably be necessary to authorize certain intelligence officers to receive operational information and to increase the intelligence-mindedness of certain command and policy officers.

(5) 4. ~~Each~~ agency should attempt to speed up existing procedures for the handling of routine items which may be critical. <sup>intelligence</sup> *Important* This refers primarily to routing procedures that sometimes result in as much as an hour's delay at each of three or four collection centers between the point of initial receipt and the ultimate addressee or evaluator.

(3) 5. Better instructions should be given to staff communications offices to ensure that intelligence is not overlooked during the initial routing of incoming material.

(1) 1. A technical survey should be undertaken in an effort to set up a secure telephone or telecon ~~link~~ <sup>facilities</sup> between the IAC Agencies in Washington for use of evaluators, analysts, and watch officers.

(2) 2. Each agency should survey the adequacy of its field evaluation procedure to ~~ensure~~ <sup>inherent</sup> that critical items are recognized in the field and send promptly to Washington by electrical means.

(3) 3. The evaluation procedure and the watch officer mechanism can be improved through the establishment of a centralized indications mechanism to provide uniformity and to assure that past information is not overlooked.

(4) 4. <sup>Appropriate</sup> Intelligence should be informed of military, diplomatic and clandestine operations so that evaluators can differentiate between <sup>foreign governments</sup> Soviet actions and reactions. (Agencies?)

(5) 5. To assure continuity, State and the three Service Agencies should set up full-time watch officers who have this as their only duty.

(6) 6. <sup>Velvet glove</sup> Intelligence operations be reviewed from time to time.

(7) 7. Each agency should assess the adequacy of its watch mechanism, particularly <sup>judicious</sup> if watch officers are to be used. <sup>rotation</sup> <sup>basis</sup>

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Security Information

9 September 1953

~~Simple~~

## SURVEY OF ALERTING PROCEDURES IN ARMY

1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, collects in the field through its overseas commands, attache system, Counter Intelligence Corps, etc. Information is analyzed preliminarily in the field and passed to Washington by cable and by pouch. G-2 believes that this field analysis assures that critical information is recognized in the shortest possible time, and that prompt action is guaranteed in that the field units assign approximately high routing precedence to each cable.
2. Cables are received in Washington in Staff Communications, Office of Chief of Staff, D.A. Here they are routed by pneumatic tube to the appropriate subdivisions of the Department, including G-2 and its production divisions, research branches, Operations Room, and the Watch Committee Secretariat. Thus, critical information that had been so recognized in the field is seen concurrently by both the Command and working echelons of Army Intelligence.
3. Routine cables are disseminated along the same channels with the likelihood that the significance of an item would be recognized by the production and research analysts, by the Operations Room officers, or by members of the Watch Committee Secretariat. This, in G-2's opinion, constitutes a three-way check to assure that critical information, not detected in the field, is not overlooked in G-2 itself.
4. The production and research units of G-2 evaluate critical information as soon as it is received, add background or elaboration, and forward their product to the G-2, to the Watch Committee chairman, and other officials as indicated by the substance.
5. The technical services (Medical Service, Army Engineers, etc.) maintain their own intelligence efforts on a decentralized basis, and all of them work closely with the Watch Committee Secretariat and with G-2 Operations Room as well as with the office of the G-2. Considerable advance has been made since World War II days in that operations and planning officers now keep G-2 well informed regarding both operations and plans, and G-2 feels that no gap exists because of a barrier between the two interests.
6. The G-2 Operations Room is the center of non-duty hour activity. It is open 24 hours a day, and is manned during non-duty hours by a field grade and a company grade officer with enlisted support. The officers, drawn from the production divisions and research branches, serve this duty on rotation. They are fully briefed on recent intelligence developments and procedures to be followed in the event critical information comes in during non-duty hours. Senior G-2 officials are called by the duty officers when critical information arrives after hours.
7. G-2 places great reliance on its intelligence units in the field and feels that they are competent to recognize critical information and to assure that it is adequately flagged and passed promptly, into intelligence channels in Washington. G-2 believes that as a number of different G-2 elements see the same incoming information, adequate provision has been made to assure that something important is not overlooked. G-2 is largely dependent on the intelligence awareness of Staff Communications. G-2's duty officers for non-duty hours are rotated and thus lack full continuity.

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